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Inclusive fitness theory captures how individuals can influ-
ence the transmission of their genes to future generations
by influencing either their own reproductive success or
that of related individuals. This framework is frequently
used for studying the way in which natural selection leads
to organisms being adapted to their environments. A num-
ber of recent papers have criticised this approach, sug-
gesting that inclusive fitness is just one of many possible
mathematical methods for modelling when traits will be
favoured by natural selection, and that it leads to errors,
such as overemphasising the role of common ancestry
relative to other mechanisms that could lead to individuals
being genetically related. Here, we argue that these sug-
gested problems arise from a misunderstanding of two
fundamental points: first, inclusive fitness is more than
just a mathematical ‘accounting method’ — it is the
answer to the question of what organisms should appear
designed to maximise; second, there is something special
about relatedness caused by common ancestry, in
contrast with the other mechanisms that may lead to indi-
viduals being genetically related, because it unites the in-
terests of genes across the genome, allowing complex,
multigenic adaptations to evolve. The critiques of inclusive
fitness theory have provided neither an equally valid
answer to the question of what organisms should appear
designed to maximise, nor an alternative process to unite
the interest of genes. Consequently, inclusive fitness re-
mains the most general theory for explaining adaptation.
Introduction
The most striking fact about living organisms is the extent to
which they appear designed or adapted for the environments
in which they live (Figure 1) [1]. The theory of natural selection
provides an explanation. Darwin [2] pointed out that those
heritable characters that are associated with greater repro-
ductive successwill tend to accumulate in biological popula-
tions, and he argued that this will lead organisms to appear
as if they were designed to maximise their reproductive suc-
cess. Hence, natural selection explains the appearance of
design without invoking an intelligent designer.
More generally, the currently accepted paradigm for the
study of adaptation, in fields such as animal behaviour,
evolutionary ecology and sociobiology, is that organisms
should appear designed to maximise their inclusive fitness,
rather than their reproductive success [3–9]. Inclusive fitness
captures how individuals are able to influence the transmis-
sion of their genes to future generations — they can either
influence their own reproductive success (direct fitness) or
the reproductive success of other individuals with which
they share genes (indirect fitness) [10,11].
However, a number of papers [12–20] have questioned
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one of many possible mathematical accounting methods
for modelling the outcome of natural selection; that it is
less correct than other mathematical methods for modelling
when traits will be favoured by natural selection; and that
it overemphasises the importance of common descent
(kinship) relative to other mechanisms that can lead to indi-
viduals being genetically related [12–20]. If valid, these
criticisms would have paradigm-shifting implications and
textbooks would need to be rewritten.
Here, we show that controversy has arisen because four
separate questions have been conflated (Table 1). Our aim
is not to question the novelty or validity of the mathematical
arguments that have been used to criticise inclusive fitness
theory, which has already been done elsewhere [21–23].
Instead, our aim is to show that the critiques of inclusive
fitness theory have asked the wrong questions, and hence
are irrelevant, even before considering the mathematical
arguments. Before we can address the different questions,
we first need to explain the different approaches that have
been used to conceptualise natural selection, and that are
at the heart of this controversy.
Different Ways of Carving Up Natural Selection
The key criterion for natural selection to favour any trait is
that the genes for this trait are positively correlated with
individual fitness [24,25]. However, correlation need not
imply causation, particularly when considering traits that
can influence the fitness of other individuals which share
genes for that trait, such as altruistic helping behaviours
[10]. Consequently, social evolution researchers have
found it helpful to partition natural selection into more
meaningful, causal relations, when examining why traits
are correlated with fitness. Debate has focused on the
relative usefulness of three basic approaches: neighbour-
modulated fitness, inclusive fitness and group selection
(Supplemental information).
First, the ‘neighbour modulated’ or ‘personal’ fitness
approach decomposes the overall correlation between an in-
dividual’s genes and its fitness into a direct and an indirect
effect (Figure 2A) [8,10,26–28]. The direct effect describes
the impact of an individual’s own genes on reproductive suc-
cess. The indirect effect describes the impact of the genes
carried by social partners of the focal individual upon the in-
dividual’s own reproductive success. The theory of ‘indirect
genetic effects’ takes a similar approach, but with a more
explicit focus on phenotypic effects [29].
Second, the ‘inclusive fitness’ approach uses the same
basic partition of natural selection into direct and indirect
effects, but conceptualises the indirect effect in a different
way (Figure 2B) [10]. Here, the indirect effect describes the
impact of the focal individual’s genes on the fitness of its
social partners, weighted by genetic relatedness. Both the
neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness approaches
lead to Hamilton’s rule [10,11], which states that a trait will
be favoured by natural selection when -c + br > 0 (where -c
is the direct fitness cost of the trait, b is the benefit provided
to social partners by the trait and r is the genetic relatedness
between the focal individual and its social partners).
The neighbour-modulated and inclusive fitness ap-
proaches differ in how they conceptualise the benefit (b)
Figure 1. Organisms appear designed or
adapted to the environment in which they live.
(A) A turtle ant soldier has a disc on its head
that appears as if it was designed to fill the
entrance to the tree cavities in which they
live, forming a ‘livingdoor’. (B) Amalepeacock
spider woos a female using a brightly-
colouredflap that looks like anartist’s psyche-
delic rendering of a spider. (C) This is not an
ant — it is a clubionid spider that appears de-
signed to look like the painfully-stinging trap
jaw ants of the genus Odontomachus, which
it lives alongside. (D) Some workers of the
honeypot ant appear as if they are designed
to act as storage containers. The cardinal
problem for evolutionary theory is to explain
this apparent design of organisms [5,57,64].
Photos used with permission, copyright Alex
Wild (A,C,D) and Ju¨rgen Otto (B).
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R578and relatedness (r) terms [8,10,26–28]. For example, con-
sider the evolution of altruism in a panmictic outbreeding
population.With neighbour-modulated fitness, there is a ten-
dency r that a focal individual who carries genes for altruism
is also aided by her social partner. To the extent that she is
aided, she receives a benefit b, and so the average benefit
to the focal individual is rb. In contrast, with inclusive fitness,
the focal individual always helps the social partner, providing
a benefit b. In this case, r is a measure of how much helping
the social partner increases the frequency of the focal indi-
vidual’s genes, such that we can express the overall genetic
benefit to the focal individual as rb.
Consequently, neighbour-modulated fitness examines
how social partners influence the fitness of the focal individ-
ual, whereas inclusive fitness examines how the focal indi-
vidual influences the fitness of its social partners. The b
term is the benefit that is either received (neighbour-modu-
lated fitness) or given (inclusive fitness) by the focal individ-
ual. The r term is a measure of the extent to which either
social partners have a similar disposition for altruism (neigh-
bour-modulated fitness), or the focal individual values its
social partners (inclusive fitness). Put simply, inclusive
fitness is actor-centric with one focal actor, whom we focus
on in a world full of recipients (including itself), while neigh-
bour-modulated fitness is recipient-centric, with one focal
recipient whom we focus on in a world full of actors
(including itself).
Third, the ‘group selection’ approach decomposes the
overall correlation between an individual’s genes and its
fitness into within-group and between-group effects (Fig-
ure 2C) [30]. The within-group effect describes the average
association between genes and fitness within social groups
in the population, and it contributes to the total action of
natural selection in proportion to the heritable variation that
exists within social groups. The between-group effect de-
scribes the association between genes and fitness at the
group level, and contributes to the total action of natural
selection in proportion to the heritable variation that exists
between social groups.Do Different Methods Yield
Different Predictions?
Our first question is whether the
different methods described above
yield different predictions for howtraits will evolve in response to natural selection? They do
not [8,10,28,31–36]. They are just different ways of dividing
up the dynamics of natural selection (Supplemental informa-
tion). No approach is more correct than the other. Conse-
quently, when modelling specific traits, researchers can
use whatever method is most useful for the task at hand.
The most frequently used methods are neighbour-modu-
lated and inclusive fitness. In particular, modern neigh-
bour-modulated fitness methods allow the modeller to go
from the underlying biology to an expression or fitness, in a
way that facilitates the development of relatively general
models [8,27,28,35,37]. In contrast, the group selection
approach is used relatively little for modelling specific traits
partly because as soon as one moves away from the
simplest, most abstract models, and wants to add in real
world biology, it often becomes analytically intractable —
for example, when populations are structured into different
classes of individual, according to sex, age, caste or
ploidy [38–40].
What Should Organisms Appear Designed for?
Our second question is which quantity does natural selection
lead organisms to appear designed to maximise (design
objective)? To put this another way: if natural selection leads
organisms to appear as if they are striving to maximise their
fitness, then what is their fitness [10,24,41]? Fitness, in the
sense of the organism’s maximand, must fulfil two criteria
(Table 2).
First, the maximand must be a ‘target’ of natural selection.
That is, the maximand must satisfy the condition that if a
gene is positively correlated with this maximand, then natu-
ral selection will lead to that gene increasing in frequency
[25,42]. This is true for neighbour-modulated fitness, and it
is also true for inclusive fitness [10,24,41,43]. In contrast, it
is not generally true that group fitness is a target of natural
selection, because whether or not traits are favoured de-
pends upon the relative importance of within-group and
between-group fitness effects [40]. Consequently, not all
genes that are associated with greater group fitness will
Table 1. Critiques of inclusive fitness theory have conflated separate questions.
Question Answer
Do the different partitions of natural selection yield different predictions? No.
What quantity does natural selection lead organisms to appear designed to
maximise (design objective)?
Inclusive fitness.
Why is it useful to have a design principle or maximand? To describe how organisms should be designed, and for linking
theoretical and empirical studies.
Is there anything special about genetic relatedness that arises from recent
common ancestry, as opposed to other genetic assortment mechanisms?
Yes, it leads to a more-or-less equal relatedness across most of the
genome, and hence allows complex multigenic adaptations to be
constructed.
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ated with lower group fitness can be favoured by natural
selection.
Second, the maximand must be under the organism’s ‘full
control’, meaning that it is determined only by the traits and
actions of the focal organism’. This is because organisms
can only appear designed to maximise something that they
are able to control. The individual does not, in general, have
full control of its neighbour-modulated fitness, as parts of
this are mediated by the actions of her social partners.
However, the individual does have full control of inclusive
fitness, as this is explicitly defined in terms of the fitness
consequences for itself and others that arise out of its actions
(Figure 2; Supplemental information) [10]. Specifically,
Hamilton [10] described inclusive fitness as personal
(neighbour-modulated) fitness, stripped of all components
causedbyothers (leaving only direct fitness), andaugmented
to allow for the consequences of the actor on others (indirect
fitness). Finally, the individual will not usually have full control
of its group’s fitness, although the group itself might be
regarded as having full control of its own fitness [40].
The general point here is that inclusive fitness is not just
an accounting method, for mathematically modelling when
traits will be favoured by natural selection [14–16,20], it is
also the answer to the question of what should organisms
appear designed to maximise [10]. No other definition of
fitness provides a measure that is both a target of selection
and also under the full control of the organism. Hence, natu-
ral selection will lead organisms to appear designed to maxi-
mise their inclusive fitness, and inclusive fitness is our most
general encapsulation of Darwinian fitness [10,41,43]. Our
aim here is not to argue that inclusive fitness is the way to
answer all evolutionary problems. For example, if you
wanted to predict gene dynamics, you would use population
genetics. Rather, inclusive fitness is the way to understand
organismal design. Similarly, we are not saying that everyone
needs to think of organisms asmaximizing agents, but rather
that you can think of them in this way, and that doing so
requires inclusive fitness.
It is important to distinguish here between the mathemat-
ical modelling and the conceptualisation of natural selection.
If the goal is simply tomodel the evolution of a particular trait,
such as altruism, then one can use whatever method is most
useful to the problem at hand. However, if the goal is to un-
derstand the adaptive rationale for altruism, or any other
trait, then the inclusive fitness approach is the only one
that fulfils the requisite criteria [5,10,41]. Indeed, because
the maths are often more straightforward under the neigh-
bour-modulated fitness approach, a common method is to
develop models with neighbour-modulated fitness and
then move to inclusive fitness for the purpose of conceptual-
isation [8,27,28]. Nonetheless, while it can be useful fortheoreticians to mix and match different approaches to their
purpose, empirical biologists studying whole organisms
need only think about inclusive fitness.
Organisms as Maximizing Agents?
Our third question is why it is useful to have a design princi-
ple or maximand? A design principle has been fundamental
for linking theoretical and empirical research. When we
observe organisms in the field, such as a foraging bird, or
an ant tending to her colony’s fungus garden, their behaviour
has the appearance of design or intention. Inclusive fitness
theory provides a link from the gene-frequency dynamics
of natural selection to the appearance of design and inten-
tion at the individual level [24,41,44]. Specifically, it allows
us to conceptualise individuals as trying to maximise some-
thing, with that ‘something’ being inclusive fitness. It is for
this reason that inclusive fitness theory has played the cen-
tral role in the study of adaptation, in fields such as behaviou-
ral and evolutionary ecology [3,4]. More generally, by
showing how a design principle emerges from the action of
natural selection, Darwinism is able to explains the apparent
design of the living world [5].
The intuitive advantage of the ‘individual as a maximizing
agent’ analogy is most easily illustrated with a biological
example. Consider social insect workers, which forgo the
chance to reproduce and instead help to rear their siblings
(Figure 3). The inclusive fitness approach suggests that the
worker does this because she is closely related to her sib-
lings and so this improves her inclusive fitness. This makes
intuitive sense, because the help and relatedness can be
easily observed and measured. In contrast, the neighbour-
modulated fitness approach suggests that workers help
because although the gene carrier is sometimes a worker,
who has no neighbour-modulated fitness, at other times
the gene carrier is a queen, whose neighbour-modulated
fitness is increased owing to help from her workers who
also carry copies of the gene. Consequently, on average, in-
dividuals carrying genes for worker helping have a higher
neighbour-modulated fitness than individuals not carrying
such genes. Whilst both descriptions are formally correct,
neighbour-modulated fitness does not engage with the
intentionality observed in individual behaviour, and hence
can be conceptually cumbersome.
The advantage of the maximising agent analogy provided
by inclusive fitness theory also becomes obvious when
considering how observational and experimental studies
are carried out and interpreted. Consider an experiment
that manipulates the behaviour of an individual, such as its
clutch size decision or level of cooperation. It is standard
practice to measure the consequences of that change in
behaviour, both for the focal individual and its social part-
ners, such that the inclusive fitness effect of the behaviour
Neighbour-modulated fitness Group selectionInclusive fitness
Current Biology
Figure 2. Partitions of natural selection.
The overall correlation between a focal indi-
vidual’s genes and her reproductive success
can be decomposed into: (A) the direct effect
on the focal individual (blue arrow) and the in-
direct effect of those genes in the focal individ-
ual’s social partners (red arrow), (B) the direct
effect on the focal individual (blue arrow) and
the indirect effect on the focal individual’s
social partners (red arrow); (C) within-group
(orange arrows) and between-group (green
arrows) effects. A distinguishing feature of
the inclusive fitness approach (B) is that the
focal individual has control of the causal
fitness effects (the arrows).
Table 2. Design and fitness maximisation.
Target of selection? Under own control?
Neighbour-modulated fitness Yes No
Inclusive fitness Yes Yes
Group fitness No Yes/No
In order to represent a quantity that the organism appears designed tomaxi-
mise, a fitness measure must be both a target of natural selection and also
under the organism’s sole control. Only inclusive fitness fulfils both of these
criteria.
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fitness (and group selection) approach emphasises correla-
tions in behaviour between relatives (or group mates) such
that, aswell as changing the behaviour of the focal individual,
the experimenter may also have to change the behaviour of
any social partners, by an amount that depended upon their
relatedness (or a measure of population structure like FST). It
is not without reason that this isn’t the approach usually
taken by empirical biologists studying whole organisms.
Another advantage of the maximising agent analogy is
that, because it focuses on the perspective of individual
actors, it emphasises when design objectives differ, and
hence readily identifies evolutionary conflicts of interest.
This includes scenarios where there can be some overlap
of interest, such as conflicts between family or group mem-
bers, and between genes within a genome [45–47]. In con-
trast, the neighbour-modulated fitness approach focuses
on the average consequences of a trait across different
actors, and so tends to obscure conflicts, providing a more
cumbersome way of conceptualising them. It is for this
reason that the inclusive fitness approach has led to the
identification and study of evolutionary conflicts [3,4,45–47].
Is There Anything Special about Common Ancestry?
We now turn to our fourth question: when considering social
adaptations, such as altruism, is there anything special
about genetic relatedness that arises from recent common
ancestry, as opposed to other assortment mechanisms
that could lead to individuals being genetically related?
Hamilton [10] was the first to point out that indirect fitness
benefits require genetic relatedness for the trait being con-
sidered, and not common ancestry (genealogical kinship)
per se. Hamilton illustrated this by showing how a gene could
be favoured if it could identify the presence of copies of itself
in other individuals and behave nepotistically towards these
other individuals, irrespective of their genealogical relation-
ship to its own carrier. Such assortment mechanisms are
usually called ‘greenbeards’, after Dawkins’ [48] thought
experiment where the gene causes its carrier to both grow
a green beard and also provide help to other individuals
with green beards.
The possibility for greenbeard-like effects has been used
to argue that assortment is the fundamental issue, and
that there is nothing special about genetic relatedness
arising from common ancestry (i.e. genealogical kinship)
[14,15,20]. In order to address this, we consider the types
of adaptation that would arise from genetic relatedness
caused by different mechanisms. Greenbeards represent
an extreme case, where the assortment mechanism andsocial behaviour are encoded on a single gene (or tightly
linked genes), and the behaviour is directed towards other
carriers of that gene [31]. We would usually expect that
assortment mechanisms and the social responses to them
are based on complex phenotypes caused bymultiple genes
scattered across the genome; for example, a gene (or genes)
for the cue on which genetic recognition was based, such as
smell, a gene for the cue and a gene for the social behaviour
[49]. When these genes are scattered, the relatedness
between two individuals at the recognition and social behav-
iour genes will, on average, be that due to common ancestry
rather than whether they share the gene for the cue per se
[49]. This means that natural selection will only favour multi-
ple gene assortment mechanisms if the cue is a reliable indi-
cator of common ancestry [49]. Consequently, we need
merely compare the types of adaptation caused by green-
beards versus common ancestry.
Assortment mechanisms, such as greenbeards, are un-
likely to lead to significant adaptation because they will be
extremely rare and can only lead to traits that are produced
by a single or small number of tightly linked genes. First,
greenbeards can be outcompeted by cheats that display
the beard without also performing the helping behaviour
(‘falsebeards’) [48,50]. Consequently, greenbeards are ex-
pected to be rare in the natural world. Second, even if a
greenbeard were stable, it would lead to a high genetic relat-
edness at the greenbeard locus, but not at other parts of the
genome (Figure 4A) [51]. This means that any resulting adap-
tationswould have to be constructed by just that greenbeard
gene and the genes tightly linked to it. Every other gene in the
genome will be united in their attempt to either produce a
falsebeard, or to replace the greenbeard with a trait that is
responding to genealogical relatedness [52]. Consequently,
given that all but the simplest traits are underpinned by mul-
tiple genes, greenbeards are unlikely to lead to elaborate
adaptation [51,52].
In contrast, a special property of recent common ancestry
is that it leads to more or less equal genetic relatedness
Figure 3. Design and purpose.
If we examine the different castes of a social
insect, they appear to have very different
designs and purposes. In the termite Macro-
termes bellicosus, the large queen (A) is
essentially an egg laying machine, while
workers (B) collect food, maintain and
enlarge the nest, and care for the queen,
eggs and young, while soldiers defend the
nest. Photos by Judith Korb and Volker
Salewski.
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Figure 4. Relatedness through common ancestry and assortment.
(A) Common ancestry: the genetic relatedness between outbred
diploid siblings is the same at all autosomal loci. (B) If genetic similarity
is caused only by a single greenbeard gene, then relatedness is
expected to drop off on either side of the greenbeard. The rate of
drop off will depend upon recombination rates, population structuring,
etc. Adapted from [51].
Review
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be pulling in the same direction when constructing adapta-
tions (Figure 4B) [51]. Furthermore, while some methods
for generating genetic associations require strong selection
differences between alleles, common descent operates
regardless of the strength of selection. These points mean
that common ancestry can favour the evolution of social
adaptations in a way that simply is not possible with other
association mechanisms [51].
The empirical data on social traits support the hypothes-
ised special role of common descent, with studies showing
that genealogical relatedness matters for a wide range of
traits, including sex allocation, policing, conflict resolution,
cooperation, altruism, spite, parasite virulence, within group
or family conflict, cannibalism, dispersal, alarm calls, eusoci-
ality and genetic conflict [3,4,9,50,53]. In contrast, green-
beard effects are incredibly rare [50], and it is still a matter
of debate whether the known examples have been selected
for because of their greenbeard properties per se. More
generally, this illustrates that whilst population genetic
models provide the gold standard for evolutionary theory,
simple one-locus models [14] can be over-interpreted in
misleading ways. This is because real-world adaptations
are underpinned by multiple loci, distributed across the
genome, rather than a single locus [54]. Inclusive fitness is
a theory of whole-organism biology.
Genes Versus Individuals?
The idea that we can treat individuals as maximising agents
is based on the implicit assumption that we can effectively
ignore the consequences of genetic conflict within individ-
uals. However, natural selection is driven by changes in
gene frequencies, and ‘selfish genes’ can be favoured to
increase their own transmission, even if this incurs a cost
at the level of the individual [47]. So, why do we not give up
on the idea of individuals as maximising agents, and just
conceptualise natural selection via gene dynamics?
One reason is that, to explain adaptation, we are almost
forced to think in terms of a maximand and at the individual
level. Even at the level of the gene, we would still want to
know what the maximand is, and the answer is ‘the inclusive
fitness of the gene’ [54]. But, adaptation is manifest at the
level of the individual, and results from the cooperation of
multiple genes distributed across the genome, not just the
operation of a single gene [54]. Consequently, we require a
theory that explains how and why genes pull together at
the individual level, and the form of adaptation that this will
lead to. Inclusive fitness theory does this. Indeed, as we
saw in the previous section, population genetic models can
be misinterpreted in terms of the adaptations we would
expect at the individual level.Another reason is that the individual approach provides a
heuristic that facilitates the interplay between theory and
data. By black boxing the genes, we can focus on other
aspects of biology, such as ecology and behaviour. This
makes it easier to both develop models, and test the
robustness of those models to changes in the underlying
biological parameters [8,55,56]. A focus on individuals also
makes it easier to spot when there will be conflicts between
individuals, such as between parents and their offspring, or
between siblings [46]. Furthermore, working out the exact
solution to a more specific genetic model might not be very
helpful, because we will rarely know the underlying genetic
architecture of a trait. The individual approach assumes
that genetic architecture does not constrain adaptation
(phenotypic gambit), and hence provides a robust approxi-
mation to a wide range of genetic models that can be
applied broadly across a range of species [21,32].
A general point here is that the individual approach trades
off generality and applicability versus exactness, in a way
that facilitates progress. Furthermore, it does so when the
exactness would usually have to be based on guesswork.
Nonetheless, we stress the importance of seeing this as a
heuristic approach, which should only be used when the ad-
vantages outweigh the disadvantages, which is best judged
empirically. The progressmadewith the individual approach,
in fields such as behavioural and evolutionary ecology, sug-
gest that the benefits usually far outweigh the costs [3,4,56].
The disadvantages of ignoring genetic conflict will often be
minor, because we expect it to have relatively little influence
on adaptation at the individual level. First, for most traits,
such as foraging or predator avoidance, the only way that
a gene can increase its transmission to the next generation
is by increasing the fitness of the individual carrying it, so
Poorly adapted individual
 
Well adapted individual
 
m i p m i p 
No conflict  Conflict 
Phenotypic value  Phenotypic value
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Phenotype Optima 
Figure 5. Conflict and fitness maximization.
The figure shows a scenario where there is a
conflict of interest over the optimum pheno-
type between genes with maternal origin (m),
paternal origin (p), or which have no informa-
tion about their origin (i) [45]. The latter also
represents the perspective of a gene trying
to maximise the inclusive fitness of the indi-
vidual. (A) If organisms were poorly fitted to
their environments, all their genes would be
pulling in much the same direction, towards
a distant set of closely-coinciding optima.
(B) It is only upon closing in upon the individ-
ual optimum that minor quantitative disagree-
ments between genes will come into play.
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genetic conflict to be limited to traits where transmission
can be altered, such as the offspring sex ratio [47]. Second,
when a gene increases its own transmission to the detriment
of the other genes in the genome, all of those other genes will
be united in what Leigh [57] termed the ‘parliament of the
genes‘ to suppress the selfish gene. So, for example, while
selfish sex ratio distorters can be common, their presence
is strongly correlated with suppressors, such that they
have little influence on the population sex ratio [58,59]. Third,
complex adaptations are underpinned by multiple loci, and
so we would not expect selfish genes acting alone to be
able to manifest complex adaptation [54]. Fourth, even in
these cases where we expect conflict, the overall effect of
genes at multiple loci pulling in different directions will often
cancel out at the individual level. The very fact that we can
observe such conflicts suggests that the organism has
attained near perfection in its adaptation (Figure 5). Further-
more, one of the best ways to discover genetic conflicts
empirically is to detect departures from inclusive fitness
maximisation at the individual level. All of these points clarify
the utility of the individual asmaximising agent analogy in the
study of adaptation.
Asking the Wrong Questions
The above points make it clear that, in order to challenge the
inclusive fitness paradigm, it would be necessary to show
that there is a more useful maximand (design objective)
than inclusive fitness. None of the critiques of inclusive
fitness have even suggested an alternative maximand,
let alone compared their relative utility [12–20]. These cri-
tiques have missed that the major purpose of inclusive
fitness is to provide an answer to the question of what organ-
isms should appear designed tomaximise. Another possibil-
ity could have been to show that the individual as a
maximizing agent analogy is not useful for linking theory to
data, in conflict with evidence from fields such as behaviou-
ral and evolutionary ecology [3,4,9], or that there is a more
useful approach. Again, none of the critiques even touched
upon this. Indeed, the critiques themselves used intentional
language such as ‘altruism’, the use of which is formally justi-
fied by the maximizing agent analogy [60], and so they
appear to endorse rather than criticize this approach.
Instead of engaging with such scientifically-relevant
issues, the papers criticizing inclusive fitness theory simply
reinvented old problems that were solved decades ago,
and are hence largely irrelevant [21,22]. For example, arguing
that inclusive fitness requires restrictive assumptions, that it
is less general, or that it does not make predictions that aredifferent from those yielded by other methods, such as pop-
ulation genetics [12–20]. It has long been known that inclu-
sive fitness theory, and all of the other partitions we have
discussed here, can be used tomake either relatively general
models with few assumptions, for the purpose of providing a
conceptual overview, or more specific models with more
assumptions, when that is useful for predicting the evolution
of specific traits [8,27,28,33,61]. To give another example,
inclusive fitness theory was not developed as a competitor
to the theory of natural selection [15]. Instead, it is the answer
to the question of what is the design principle (maximand)
that emerges from the process of natural selection, and so
we expect that, when the same assumptions are made,
different methods should yield the same prediction.
It is not clear why the role of inclusive fitness as a maxi-
mand has been ignored in the recent critiques of inclusive
fitness theory. A reading of even just the abstract of
Hamilton’s [10] original inclusive fitness paper makes clear
that his motivation was to find a maximand of natural selec-
tion, and not just an accounting method: ‘a quantity is found
which incorporates the maximizing property of Darwinian
fitness. This quantity is named ‘inclusive fitness’. Species
following the model should tend to evolve behaviour such
that each organism appears to be attempting to maximize
its inclusive fitness’. Since then, the concept of inclusive
fitness maximisation has been central to fields such as
behavioural and evolutionary ecology [3,4,32,43,62].
Another criticism of inclusive fitness theory has been that it
focuses on common ancestry, which is just one mechanism
for producing genetic associations [12,14]. This criticism is
misguided on two counts. First, the possibility for other
association mechanisms was already clarified almost 40
years ago, within the framework of inclusive fitness theory
[10,31]. Second, the aim of inclusive fitness theory is not
just to explain when a single gene will spread, but rather
to explain complex organismal adaptation. Adaptations
are underpinned by multiple genes distributed across the
genome, and so we need a mechanism that leads to genes
pulling in the same direction when constructing social adap-
tations. Recent common ancestry neatly solves this problem
[51], and has been central to explaining the empirical data on
all forms of social trait, from cannibalism to altruism [3,4].
None of the critiques of inclusive fitness theory have sug-
gested an equally valid or better way to unite the interest of
genes.
By asking the wrong questions, and reinventing long-
solved problems, these critiques have removed attention
from more biologically interesting questions on the use of
inclusive fitness theory. For example, in bacteria, mobile
Review
R583genetic units, such as plasmids, canmove horizontally, lead-
ing to the genes on the plasmid having a different inclusive
fitness optimum [63]. When is this optimum sufficiently
different from that of the chromosomes that we have to think
of the cell as fragmented into two maximizing agents (chro-
mosomes versus plasmid), rather than a single maximising
agent? Other unresolved issues include the impact on inclu-
sive fitness maximisation of non-additive fitness effects
[43,54], or traits not being conditionally expressed according
to the actor class, such as queen or worker [8].Conclusions
It is useful to consider whatwewould require froma theory of
adaptation, if we were to develop one from scratch. We
would require the theory to do three things: first, capture
the quantitative dynamics of natural selection, so that it
can predict the evolution of specific traits; second, provide
a maximand or design objective for organismal traits; third,
explain why genes across the genome pull in the same direc-
tion, when constructing complex adaptations. The beauty
and unique position of inclusive fitness theory is that it fulfils
all three of these requirements. None of the critiques of inclu-
sive fitness theory have suggested an alternative theory of
adaptation that fulfils these criteria.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental information providing conceptual background can be
found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.
05.031.
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